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OPINION OF THE COURT
             
ALDISERT, Circuit Judge.
In the petition by Errol O’Neil
Nugent at No. 02-4329 for review of a
final order of removal by the Board of
Immigration Appeals (“BIA”), we must
decide whether we have jurisdiction
inasmuch as Nugent was ordered removed
from the United States under 8 U.S.C. §
1227(a)(2)(A)(ii)  for having been
convicted of two crimes involving moral
turpitude.  In the consolidated appeal at
04-1541 from a judgment of the United
States District Court for the Eastern
District of Pennsylvania we must decide
whether a conviction under a Pennsylvania
theft by deception statute constitutes an
aggravated felony.
 We hold that we lack jurisdiction
in the petition for review of the final order
of removal and will dismiss the petition,
but, for reasons other than those stated by
the district court, we affirm the judgment
of the district court on the aggravated
felony issue denying the writ of habeas
3corpus without prejudice to Appellant’s
applying to the Attorney General for
cancellation of the removal order pursuant
to 8 U.S.C. § 1229b.  We will first address
the petition for review.
I.
Nugent is a native and citizen of
Jamaica who entered the United States on
August 25, 1971, as a lawful permanent
resident when he was seven years old.  On
January 30, 1984, he was convicted in the
Court of Common Pleas of Montgomery
County for the State of Pennsylvania of
theft by unlawful taking (theft of movable
property) in violation of 18 Pa. Cons. Stat.
Ann. § 3921(a) (West 1973 & Supp. 1983)
and receiving stolen property in violation
of 18 Pa. Cons. Stat. Ann. § 3925(a) (West
1973 & Supp. 1983).  The crime involved
theft of two typewriters valued at a total of
approximately $1,900.  Nugent could have
been sentenced to five years imprisonment,
but instead he was sentenced to 12 months
on probation. Theft of the two typewriters
valued at this amount constituted a
misdemeanor of the first degree.  See 18
Pa. Cons. Stat. Ann. § 3903(b) (West 1973
& Supp. 1983).  A misdemeanor of the
first degree was punishable by up to five
years imprisonment.  See 18 Pa. Cons.
Stat. Ann. § 1104(1) (West 1983); Com v.
Schreiber, 466 A.2d 203, 208 (Pa. Super.
1983) (holding that a sentence of five
years imprisonment would have been
appropriate for a first-degree misdemeanor
conviction of theft by unlawful taking).
On November 28, 2000, Nugent
was convicted in the Court of Common
Pleas of Montgomery County for the State
of Pennsylvania of theft by deception in
violation of 18 Pa. Cons. Stat. Ann. §
3922(a) (West 1983 & Supp. 2000).  He
was sentenced to a term of imprisonment
of not less than six months but not more
than 23 months.
It was on the basis of Nugent’s
2000 Pennsylvania conviction that the
Immigration and Naturalization Service
( “ I N S ” ) 1  cha rg e d  N u g en t  w i th
removability from the United States under
8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(A)(iii) for having
been convicted of an aggravated felony as
defined in 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43)(G).  The
original Notice to Appear stated:
4.  You were, on November 28,
2000, convicted in the Court of
Common  Pleas,  Coun ty of
Montgomery, Commonwealth of
1 The INS is now known as the
Bureau of Citizenship and Immigration
Services (“BCIS”) within the Department
of Homeland Security (“DHS”).  See
Homeland Security Act of 2002, Pub. L.
No. 107-296, § 451, 116 Stat. 2135, 2195
(2002) (codified at 6 U.S.C. § 271 (Supp.
2003)).  Within the BCIS is the Office of
United States Immigration Enforcement
(“USICE”).  Id.  Because the operative
events in this case took place before the
name change, INS is used here.  In the
appeal at 04-1541 the principal defendant
in the habeas corpus proceedings was
Patricia Mullen, Associate Special Agent
in charge of the Philadelphia office of
USICE. 
4Pennsylvania for the offenses of
T H E F T  B Y  D E C E P T I O N
(DOCKET # 1061-00) and
D R I V I N G  U N D E R  T H E
INFLUENCE (DOCKET # 1974-
00), in violation of Title 18,
Pennsylvania Statutes, Section
3922 and Title 75, Pennsylvania
Statutes, Section 3731.
(App. at 206.)
On September 7, 2001, Nugent filed
a motion to terminate removal proceedings
on the basis that his conviction for theft by
deception under Pennsylvania law did not
constitute an aggravated felony theft
offense as defined by 8 U.S.C. §
1101(a)(43)(G).
On September 14, 2001, an
immigration judge (“IJ”) issued an
interlocutory order denying Nugent’s
motion to terminate removal proceedings.
The IJ concluded that Nugent’s conviction
for theft by deception constituted an
aggravated felony theft under 8 U.S.C. §
1101(a)(43)(G).
On September 12, 2001, the INS
charged Nugent with being subject to
r e m o v a l  u n d e r  8  U . S . C .  §
1227(a)(2)(A)(ii)  for having been
convicted of two or more crimes involving
moral turpitude.  In notifying Nugent of
the additional charge, the INS stated in its
“ A d d i t i o n a l  C h a r g e s  o f
Inadmissibility/Deportability” Form I-261:
6.  You were convicted on January
30, 1984 in the Court of Common
Pleas of Montgomery County for
the State of Pennsylvania, of Theft
of Movable Property and Theft by
Receiving Stolen Property, in
violation of Pennsylvania Criminal
Laws Sections 3921 and 3925.
7.  The conviction alleged above in
Allegation No. 6 and the conviction
alleged in Allegation No. 4 on the
Notice to Appear dated February
14, 2001 did not arise out of a
single  scheme of cr iminal
misconduct.
(App. at 138.) 
At a hearing before the IJ on
October 11, 2001, the following colloquy
took place:
Judge to  Mr. Mazer
[representing petitioner
Nugent]:
. . . . 
Q. And how do you





Q.  Okay.  You concede that they
constitute crimes involving
moral turpitude then?
5A.  Ah, yes.
(App. at 124.)
On the same day, October 11, 2001,
the IJ issued an oral decision concluding
that Nugent was subject to removal as an
aggravated felon.  The IJ then added:
“Further, in court today counsel has
conceded the allegations set forth in the I-
261.  The Court finds the respondent is
subject to removal as charged therein.”
(App. at 80.)  As set forth above, the Form
I-261 added paragraphs 6 and 7 in which
the INS listed Nugent’s 1984 conviction
for theft by unlawful taking and referenced
his 2000 conviction for theft by deception.
Thus, the two crimes involving moral
turpitude consisted of theft by deception,
conviction date November 28, 2000, as
contained in the INS’ Allegation No. 4 in
the original Notice to Appear, and theft by
unlawful taking, conviction date January
30, 1984, as contained in the INS’
Allegation Nos. 6 and 7 in the Form I-261.
The IJ specifically ordered Nugent
removed from the United States based on
convictions for both the aggravated felony
listed in the Notice to Appear and the two
crimes of moral turpitude listed in the
“Form I-261, Additional Charges of
Inadmissibility/Deportability.”
Nugent appealed the IJ’s decision to
the BIA, and on November 18, 2002, the
BIA affirmed the IJ’s decision without
opinion, thereby adopting the IJ’s decision
as the final agency determination.  Nugent
timely appealed the BIA’s order.
II.
The BIA had jurisdiction pursuant
to 8 C.F.R. §§ 1003.1(b)(3) and 1240.15 to
review the decision of the IJ.  We have
jurisdiction pursuant to 8 U.S.C. §
1252(a)(1) and (b) “to determine our
jurisdiction under [ 8 U.S .C.] §
1252(a)(2)(C).”  Drakes v. Zimski, 240
F.3d 246, 247 (3d Cir. 2001).  Section
1252(a)(2)(C), the INA’s no-review
provision, bars us from reviewing any final
removal order for an alien who has been
ordered removed from the United States
because of convictions for either an
aggravated felony or two crimes of moral
turpitude, among other offenses.  Thus, we
mus t  “de termine whe the r  t hese
jurisdictional facts are present.”  Valansi v.
Ashcroft, 278 F.3d 203, 207 (3d Cir.
2002).
In determining the pure legal
questions before us that govern our own
jurisdiction, we apply a de novo standard
of review.  Id.
III.
The INA’s no-review provision
provides in relevant part:
No twi thstand ing any  o the r
provision of law, no court shall
have jurisdiction to review any
final order of removal against an
alien who is removable by reason
of having committed a criminal
offense covered in section
1182(a)(2) or 1227(a)(2)(A)(iii)
[aggravated felony], (B), (C), or
(D) of this title, or any offense
c o v e r e d  b y  s e c t i o n
1227(a)(2)(A)(ii) [two or more
6crimes involving moral turpitude,
not arising out of a single scheme
of criminal misconduct] of this title
for which both predicate offenses
are, without regard to their date of
commission, otherwise covered by
section 1227(a)(2)(A)(i) of this
title.
8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(C).  
Nugent’s 1984 conviction for theft
by unlawful taking (theft of movable
property) was a crime involving moral
turpitude.  The INA does not define moral
turpitude, but we have noted that a legal
dictionary defines the term as “[c]onduct
that is contrary to justice, honesty, or
morality.”  De Leon-Reynoso v. Aschroft,
293 F.3d 633, 636 (3d Cir. 2002) (quoting
Black’s Law Dictionary 1026 (7th ed.
1999)).  Although Nugent received a
sentence of only 12 months on probation
for the 1984 conviction, he could have
been sentenced to up to five years
imprisonment.  See 18 Pa. Cons. Stat. Ann.
§ 1104 (West 1983); 18 Pa. Cons. Stat.
Ann. §§ 3903 and 3921 (West 1973 &
Supp. 1983).
L i k e w i s e , Nug en t ’ s  200 0
conviction for theft by deception
constituted a crime involving moral
turpitude.  Nugent received a sentence of
imprisonment of not less than six months
but not more than 23 months.  The 1984
and 2000 crimes did “not aris[e] out of a
single scheme of criminal misconduct . . .
.”  8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(A)(ii).  Both
crimes of moral turpitude could have
resulted in sentences “of one year or
longer[,]” id. § 1227(a)(2)(A)(i)(II), and
whether the crimes were committed more
than five years after Nugent’s admission to
the United States is irrelevant under 8
U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(C).  Therefore, under
the no review provision, § 1252(a)(2)(C),
we lack jurisdiction to review the removal
order based on Nugent’s having committed
two crimes involving moral turpitude, §
1227(a)(2)(A)(i)-(ii).
Although Nugent concedes that he
is subject to removal based on his
convictions for two crimes involving
moral turpitude, he nevertheless contests
the order of removal based on the
aggravated felony conviction because he
contends that the Pennsylvania theft by
deception conviction set forth in paragraph
No. 4 of the Notice to Appear does not
constitute an aggravated felony under 8
U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43)(G).  For its part, the
government concedes that “Mr. Nugent is
removable both by reason of having
committed an offense that is properly
considered an aggravated felony and by
reason of having committed two crimes
involving moral turpitude for which,
respectively, he could have received a
sentence of one year . . . .”  (Br. for Resp’t
at 2.)  The government nevertheless asks
us to address the aggravated felony issue
to obviate the need for Nugent to seek
resolution of that issue via a petition for
writ of habeas corpus.  (Id. at 18-19 n.4.)
 Having decided, or more properly,
because the parties stipulate, that we have
7no jurisdiction to review the final order
bottomed on moral turpitude grounds, we
must now decide whether this court
possesses jurisdiction to consider the issue
both parties have urged upon us by brief
and oral argument, to-wit, whether a
conviction under the Pennsylvania theft by
deception statute constitutes an aggravated
felony under 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43)(G).
It is to this issue that we now turn.
IV.
  A federal court, whether trial or
appellate, is obliged to notice want of
jurisdiction on its own motion.  Mansfield,
C. & L.M. Ry. Co. v. Swan, 111 U.S. 379,
381-386 (1884).  We have jurisdiction in
immigration cases to determine whether
jurisdictional facts are present.  Drakes,
240 F.3d at 247.  “Graven in stone is the
maxim that parties cannot confer
jurisdiction on a federal court by consent
or stipulation.”  Reale Int’l, Inc. v. Federal
Republic of Nigeria, 647 F.2d 330, 331
(2d Cir. 1981).  “Without jurisdiction the
court cannot proceed at all in any cause.
Jurisdiction is power to declare the law,
and when it ceases to exist, the only
function remaining to the court is that of
announcing the fact and dismissing the
cause.”  Steel Co. v. Citizens for a Better
Env’t, 523 U.S. 83, 94 (1998) (quoting Ex
parte McCardle, 7 Wall. 506, 514 (1869)).
“For a court to pronounce upon the
meaning or the constitutionality of a state
or federal law when it has no jurisdiction
to do so is, by very definition, for a court
to act ultra vires.”  Id. at 101-102.
V.
 Nugent asks us to review not the
final order but one of two reasons for
removal in the final order.  For its part, the
government recognizes that we lack
jurisdiction because of the moral turpitude
convictions but somehow seeks a decision
on the aggravated felony issue.  To assist
us in deciding this very difficult issue, on
February 11, 2004, we requested
supplemental briefing:
By statute, our jurisdiction is
limited to reviewing final orders, 8
U.S.C. § 1252(a)(1), (b), (d) and
(g), not a particular reason
supporting the order.  If we do not
have jurisdiction to review the
order based on one of the reasons
(i.e., Petitioner’s removability on
grounds of two crimes of moral
turpitude), what authority do we
have to review another reason
supporting the order (i.e., whether
the BIA erred in determining that
Petitioner’s conviction constitutes
an aggravated felony)? 
In Petitioner’s response dated March 1,
2004, he advised the court:
In October 2003, Petitioner filed a
petition for writ of habeas corpus in
the Eastern District of Pennsylvania
which was docketed at No:
03-cv-6064 and assigned to the
Honorable J. Curtis Joyner, Judge
of the Eastern District of
Pennsylvania. That petition for writ
of habeas corpus raised the single
question that has been presented to
8this Court, whether theft by
deception under Pennsylvania law
is a theft offense or a fraud/deceit
offense. The reason for filing that
petition at that time was that Mr.
Nugent had just been detained by
DHS and this Court denied a stay
of removal. The government
opposed the stay of removal in this
Court on jurisdictional grounds –
those raised recently by this Court –
but that denial of the stay did not
state a basis for the motions panel
decision denying the stay. All facts
regarding this Court's consideration
of the matter, as well as the denial
of the stay, was set forth in the
petition for a writ of habeas corpus.
Judge Joyner issued a stay shortly
after the filing of the petition, but,
on February 19, 2004, denied the
Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus,
holding, without opinion or
ana1ysis, that theft by deception is
an aggravated felony. On February
27, 2004, Petitioner appealed the
order of Judge Joyner to this Court.
Attached hereto is a copy of the
notice of appeal as well as the
docketing statement from this
Court.
The habeas appeal has been
docketed in this Court at 04-1541.  By
order dated March  5, 2004, we
consolidated the habeas appeal from the
United States District Court at No. 04-
1541 with the present petition to review
the Order of the BIA at No. 02-4329.  In
view of this consolidation, and in light of
the thorny jurisdictional problem, we will
not consider the aggravated felony issue in
this proceeding at No. 02-4329.  Rather,
we will consider it in the appeal of the
district court’s habeas corpus judgment at
No. 04-1541.  
Accordingly, we will dismiss for
lack of jurisdiction the petition to review
the removal order based on Nugent’s
having committed two crimes involving
moral turpitude.  See 8 U.S.C. §§
1252(a)(2)(C) and 1227(a)(2)(A).         
We now turn to the appeal from the
district court at No. 04-1541.
VI.
Nugent contends that the district
court erred in denying his habeas corpus
petition because it held his 2000
Pennsylvania conviction for theft by
deception was “a theft offense (including
receipt of stolen property) or burglary
offense for w hich th e term of
imprisonment [is] at least one year.” 8
U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43)(G).  Because the
denial of the writ of habeas corpus was a
final order and an appeal was timely we
have jurisdiction.  42 U.S.C. § 1291.  Our
review is plenary on this issue involving
statutory construction.  Valansi, 278 F.3d
at 207.
Appellant represents to us that
because in October, 2003 he was detained
by the DHS, he applied for writ of habeas
corpus under 28 U.S. C. § 2411(c) in the
district court.  “The petition . . . raised the
single question that has been presented to
9this Court, whether theft by deception
under Pennsylvania law is a theft offense
or a fraud/deceit offense.” (Ltr. of
Petitioner’s Counsel to the court dated
March 1, 2004, p. 3.)  Although by order
dated February 19, 2004, the district court
denied the petition without a detailed
statement of reasons, it stated in a footnote
to its order: “This Court finds that the
Petitioner was convicted of an aggravated
felony and as such, he is removable.  See 8
U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43)(G).” 
 For the reasons that follow, we
disagree with the district court’s sole
reason for denying the writ.  We hold that
the Appellant is removable, but not on the
basis of Section 1101(a)(43)(G) for having
been convicted of an aggravated felony, as
stated by the court, but solely on the basis
of  8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(A)(ii) for having
been convicted of two or more crimes
involving moral turpitude.  We will affirm
the judgment of the district court on this
ground only, and apply the tenet that we
may affirm for reasons completely
different from those advanced by the
district court.  PAAC v. Rizzo, 502 F. 2d
306, 308 n.1 (3d Cir. 1974); cert. denied,
419 U.S. 1108 (1975) (“[i]t is proper for
an appellate court to affirm a correct
decision of a lower court even when that
decision is based on an inappropriate
ground”) (emphasis in original).  We now
discuss in detail why we disagree with the
district court’s stated reason that Nugent’s
conviction under Pennsylvania’s theft by
deception statute, 18 Pa. Cons. Stat. Ann.
§ 3922, constitutes an “aggravated felony”
as defined by the INA.  We have not
previously addressed whether a conviction
under Pennsylvania’s theft by deception
statute comes within the rubric of an
aggravated felony as it relates to a “theft
offense” under 8 U.S. C. § 1101(a)(43)(G)
and/or “an offense . . . that involves fraud
o r  d e c e i t ”  u n de r  8  U .S .C  §
1101(a)(43)(M)(i).  
The record indicates that on January
8, 1999, Nugent attempted to make two
withdrawals totaling $3,450 from an
account in the name of Earl Rampert at
Willow Grove Bank in Abington
Township, Pennsylvania.  Earlier on the
same day, Nugent had made separate
withdrawals of $1,450 and $2,000,
respectively, from the Willow Grove and
Hatboro branches of Willow Grove Bank.
The account from which Nugent attempted
to make the withdrawals had been opened
with a $100 deposit on December 13,
1998, and a check for $4,831.26 had been
deposited into the account on January 6,
1999.  Nugent admitted to police that the
$4,831.26 check was counterfeit.
On November 28, 2000, Nugent
was convicted in the Court of Common
Pleas of Montgomery County for the State
of Pennsylvania of theft by deception in
violation of 18 Pa. Cons. Stat. Ann. § 3922
(West 1983 & Supp. 2000).2  Section 3922
2The statute reads:
A person is guilty of theft if he
intentionally obtains or withholds
property of another by deception. 
A person deceives if he
10
is taken word for word from § 223.3 of the
Model Penal Code (“Code”) promulgated
by the American Law Institute (“ALI”) in
1962.  Nugent was sentenced to a term of
imprisonment of not less than six months
but not more than 23 months.
VII.
The IJ concluded and the BIA
agreed that Nugent’s Pennsylvania
conviction of theft by deception came
within the purview of 8 U.S.C. §
1101(a)(43)(G), that includes as an
“aggravated felony” any “theft offense
(including receipt of stolen property) and
robbery for which the term of
imprisonment [is] at least one year.”
Nugent argues that because his
conviction for theft by deception involved
fraud or deceit, it is not a “theft offense”
under 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43)(G), but a
fraud or deceit offense under 18 U.S.C. §
1101(a)(43)(M)(i), in which “[t]he term
‘aggravated felony’ means . . . an offense
that . . . involves fraud or deceit in which
the loss to the victim or victims exceeds
$10,000[.]”  The loss suffered by the
victims of Nugent’s theft by deception did
not exceed $10,000, and thus the INS did
not charge him with removability based on
Section 1101(a)(43)(M)(i).  
Whether Nugent’s theft by
deception offense is a “theft offense”
and/or a “an offense involving fraud or
deceit” is a distinction with a serious
difference, as it carries a significant
consequence for Nugent.  There is no
minium dollar amount to constitute an
aggravated felony if the Pennsylvania
conviction is a “theft offense” as
contemplated by Section 1101(a)(43)(G),
but if it is “an offense that . . . involves
fraud or deceit” and the loss to the victim
or victims is $10,000 or less, it would not
qualify as an aggravated felony under
Section 1101(a)(43)(M)(i).  Here, the bad
check amounted to only $4831.26.
Carrying his reasoning one step
further, Nugent argues that although he is
subject to removal based on his
convictions for two crimes involving
intentionally:
(1) creates or reinforces a false
impression, including false
impressions as to law, value,
intention or other state of mind;
but deception as to a person’s
intention to perform a promise
shall not be inferred from the fact
alone that he did not subsequently
perform the promise;
(2) prevents another from
acquiring information which
would affect his judgment of a
transaction; or
(3) fails to correct a false
impression which the deceiver
previously created or reinforced,
or which the deceiver knows to be
influencing another to whom he
stands in a fiduciary or
confidential relationship.
18 Pa. Cons. Stat. Ann. § 3922(a) (West
1983 & Supp. 2000).
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moral turpitude, convictions on this
ground alone do not prevent him from
applying for cancellation of the removal
order pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1229b.
Having a conviction that is deemed an
aggravated felony, however, would make
Nugent ineligible to apply for the
cancellation.  See 8 U.S.C. § 1229b(a)(3)
(stating that the Attorney General may not
cancel removal in the case of an alien who
has been convicted of an aggravated
felony).
 Nugent argues first that the
determination of what constitutes a “theft
offense” in the context of the INA’s
definition of an “aggravated felony” is
made by reference to a federal standard
rather than the labels attached to crimes by
Pennsylvania’s criminal laws.  See Taylor
v. United States, 495 U.S. 575, 592 (1990)
(stating that the term “burglary” in 18
U.S.C. § 924(e) “must have some uniform
definition independent of the labels
employed by the various States’ criminal
codes”); In re V-Z-S-, 22 Interim Decision
1338 (BIA 2000) (explaining that “we
generally apply a federal standard in
determining whether a state offense fits
within the aggravated felony definition”).
Nugent is correct in saying that
Pennsylvania’s labeling of the crime as
theft by deception is not determinative of
its status as a theft offense under Section
1101(a)(43)(G).  Rather, this court must
examine the plain language of the INA and
“assume that the legislative purpose is
expressed by the ordinary meaning of the
words used.”  INS v. Phinpathya, 464 U.S.
183, 189 (1984) (internal quotations and
citations omitted).
Moreover, Nugent contends that
Congress ’  in c lus ion  in  Se ct ion
1101(a)(43)(M)(i) of the language “fraud
or deceit in which the loss to the victim or
victims exceeds $10,000” demonstrates
that Congress did not intend fraud or
deceit offenses involving $10,000 or less
to nevertheless be defined as aggravated
felonies under Section 1101(a)(43)(G).
See INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S.
421, 432 (1987) (explaining “where
Congress includes particular language in
one section of a statute but omits it in
another section of the same Act, it is
generally presumed that Congress acts
intentionally and purposefully in the
disparate inclusion or exclusion”) (internal
quotations and citation omitted).  
Although we reject Nugent’s
“either-or” argument, for the reasons that
follow, we agree with his contention that
an offense under Pennsylvania’s theft by
deception statute falls within Section
1101(a)(43)(M)(i) so that it would not be
an aggravated felony unless the victim
suffered a loss exceeding $10,000.  But we
must go further, we must decide whether
the Pennsylvania statute must also meet
t h e  r e q u i r e m e n t s  o f  S e c t i o n
1101(a)(43)(G).
VIII.
In aligning state and federal
criminal offenses, previously this court has
applied a “formal categorical approach”
that requires comparison of the elements
of the state law offense to see if they
12
“encompass[] acts beyond those subject to
prosecution under the federal definition.”
Drakes, 240 F.3d at 248-249 (noting the
Supreme Court’s endorsement of such an
approach in Taylor, 495 U.S. at 600).  
Where federal criminal statutes use
words of established meaning
without further elaboration, courts
typically give those terms their
common law definition. Moskal v.
United States, 498 U.S. 103, 114 . .
. (1990); Gilbert v. United States,
370 U.S. 650, 655 . . . (1962) ("in
the absence of anything to the
contrary it is fair to assume that
Congress used ['theft'] in the statute
in its common-law sense."). If
research into the common law
y i e l d s  s e v e r a l  c o m p e t i n g
definitions, however, courts should
look to the reading that "best
accords with the overall purposes
of the statute" even if it is the
minority view. Moskal, 498 U.S. at
116-17 . . . . Where the traditional
definition is out of step with the
modern meaning of a term, more
" g e n e r i c ,  c o n t e m p o r a r y "
definitions--such as those found in
state statutes--may apply. See
Taylor, 495 U.S. at 596, 598 . . . .
Furthermore, "Congress' general
purpose in enacting a law may
prevail over this rule of statutory
construction" altogether.  Id.
Drakes, 240 F. 3d at 249. 
Under this approach, “we must
examine [Pennsylvania’s theft by
deception] law to see if it encompasses
acts beyond those subject to prosecution
under the federal [theft offense]
definition[,]” as contemplated by 8 U.S.C.
§ 1101(a)(43)(G).  Id. at 249.  More
specifically, we must determine whether a
Pennsylvania theft by deception offense is
also an “offense involving fraud or deceit”
set forth in 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43)(M)(i).
Unfortunately the INA does not
define “theft offense,” and equally
unfortunately,  Congress has not supplied
a definition of “theft” or “larceny” in the
galaxy of federal offenses.  And, in the
context of the facts in this case, we are
unwilling to say that the contretemps
involving a theft offense crime and a fraud
or deceit crime is free from ambiguity.  We
therefore must refer to the teachings of
Drakes and follow the “formal categorical”
approach.
IX.
Our starting point is clear.  Where
federal criminal statutes use words of
established meaning without further
elaboration, courts typically give those
terms their common law definition.
The common law spoke in terms of
“larceny,” rather than “theft” and the
word s are  used interchange ably.
Blackstone defined larceny simply as “the
felonious taking and carrying away of the
personal goods of another.” 2 Blackstone,
Commentaries on the Laws of England,
Book IV, at 230 (1879).  But in the
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development of the common law, courts
defined larceny in more comprehensive
terms.  The refined common law
description appears to be “the felonious
taking by trespass and carrying away by
any person of the personal goods or things
of another from any place, without the
latter’s consent and with the felonious
intent to deprive the owner of his or her
property permanently and to convert it to
the taker’s own use . . . .”  50 Am. Jur. 2d,
Larceny § 1.  Professor Wayne R. LaFave
supplies a concise summary:
Larceny at common law may be defined as
the (1) trespassory, (2) taking and (3)
carrying away of the (4) personal property
(5) of another (6) with intent to steal it.
American statutes dealing with larceny as
a discrete offense have generally left the
six elements of the crime unchanged,
except that there has been considerable
enlargement of the kinds of property which
can be the subject of larceny.
Wayne R. LaFave, 3 Substantive Criminal
Law § 19.2, at 62 (2nd ed. 2003) (footnote
omitted).
Before statutory offenses appeared
on the scene, “[c]hoses in action including
bonds and notes of all classes, according to
the common law, are not the subject of
larceny, being mere rights of action,
having no corporeal existence; though . . .
a person may be indicted for stealing the
paper on which they are written.” I
Wharton’s Criminal Law § 876, at 766
(10th ed. 1896) (emphasis added).  A bank
check was considered a chose-in-action
excluded from the common law offense of
larceny.  See Bell v. United States, 462
U.S. 356, 360 (1983).
Thus, it would seem that the
modern crime of obtaining property by
false pretenses was not even a crime at
common law.  To plug the loophole, in
1757 Parliament enacted a statute that
punished one who “knowingly and
designedly, by false pretense or pretenses,
shall obtain from any person or persons,
money, goods, wares or merchandises,
with intent to cheat or defraud any person
or persons of the same.”  30 Geo II, c. 24
(1757) (cited in LaFave, supra, at 114).  In
the eighteenth century, “[t]he theoretical
distinction between false pretenses and
larceny by trick may be stated simply.  If a
thief, through his trickery, acquired title to
the property from the owner, he has
obtained property by false pretenses; but if
he merely acquired possession from the
owner, he has committed larceny by trick.”
Bell, 462 U.S. at 359-360 (emphasis
added).
Specific to Pennsylvania, our
research discloses that the false pretenses
statute, 30 Geo II, c. 24, was not
“received” by the “province” prior to the
Declaration of Independence and the
subsequent creation of the present
Commonwealth:
An act was passed on the 28th
January, 1777, entitled ‘An Act to
revive and put in force such and so
much of the late laws of the
province of Pennsylvania, as is
judged necessary to be in force in
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this commonwealth.’  In this act it
is provided, that the common law,
and such of the statute laws of
England as have been heretofore in
force in the said province, shall be
in force, except as hereafter
excepted.
Samuel Roberts, Digest of Select British
Statutes xv (1847) (hereinafter “Digest”)
(discussed in Commonwealth v. Guy, 41
Pa. D & C 2d 151, 156 (1966) (Aldisert,
J.)).  An examination of Pennsylvania’s
official compendium of British Statutes
that were deemed to be in effect at the time
Pennsylvania became a state reveals that
the statute 30 Geo II, c. 24 was not
included.  See generally, Digest
(containing the full December 14, 1808,
Report to the Pennsylvania legislature by
the Justices of the Supreme Court of
Pennsylvania “of the English statutes
which are in force in the said
commonwealth, and of those of the said
statutes which in their opinion ought to be
incorporated into the statute laws of the
said commonwealth[,]” id. at xv).
From the foregoing discussion, we
must conclude that the government may
not find support for its position in the
common law crime of larceny, or theft,
because the property that was the subject
of its asportation had to be tangible and
corporeal.  Choses-in-action, like bonds,
notes, and, to be sure, modern bank
checks, were not considered goods or
property in the context of common law
larceny.  Similarly, Nugent finds no succor
in the common law because the crime of
false pretenses, a fraud or deceit crime,
was the product of Parliament and not the
collective experience of the judiciary.
Following the direction of the
“categorical approach” in Drakes, if
research into the common law does not
supply the answer, we look to the reading
that best accords with the overall purpose
of the statute.  In so doing, however,
“[w]here the traditional definition is out of
step with the modern meaning of a term,
more ‘generic, contemporary’ definitions
– such as that found in state statutes – may
apply.”  Drakes, 240 F.3d at 249 (quoting
Taylor, 495 U.S. at 596). 
X.
As early as 1925, Judge Cardozo
was preaching the use of generic,
contemporary definitions rather than older,
if not truly ancient, approaches. When
speaking of the difference between larceny
and embezzlement, he said, “[t]he
distinction, now largely obsolete, did not
ever correspond to any essential difference
in the character of the acts or in their effect
upon the victim. The crimes are one to-day
in the common speech of men as they are
in moral quality.”  Van Vechten v. Am.
Eagle Fire Ins. Co, 146 N.E. 432, 433
(N.Y. 1925).
In 1983, the Supreme Court was
faced with a problem similar to what we
face in this case.  Bell, 462 U.S. at 357.
Here, we must decide whether the
Pennsylvania offense of larceny by
deception (trick) involving $10,000 or less
is an “aggravated felony” as defined in
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Section 1103(a)(43) of the INA.  Whereas
in Bell, the Court had to interpret the bank
robbery provision, 18 U.S.C. § 2113(b),
that imposes criminal sanctions on
“[w]hoever takes and carries away, with
intent to steal or purloin, any property or
money or any other thing of value,
exceeding $100 belonging to, or in the
care, custody, control, management, or
possession of any bank, credit union, or
any savings and loan association.” 462
U.S. at 357-358.
In Bell, the Court discussed
extremely technical distinctions present in
old interpretations of two offenses –
larceny by trick and false pretenses.  Bell
opened a bank account and deposited
therein a $10,000 check belonging to
another.  After the check cleared, he closed
the account and was paid the total balance
in cash.  He was arrested and convicted.
The question for decision was whether the
restricted common law definition of
robbery should apply. Although the court
was faced with a robbery statute, its
discussion concentrated on concepts of
larceny by trick. 
The Court concluded, “Congress
has not adopted the elements of larceny in
common-law terms[,]” explaining that the
statutory language “takes and carries
away” represents merely one element of
common law larceny and “is entirely
consistent with false pretenses.” Id. at 360.
Moreover, the statutory language “with
intent to steal or purloin” has no
established common law meaning.  Id.
(citing United States v. Turley, 322 U.S.
407, 411-412 (1957)).  The Court pointed
to two other aspects of § 2113(b) that
indicate Congress’ “intention to go beyond
the common-law definition of larceny.”
Id.  First, whereas common law larceny
excluded “theft of a written instrument
embodying a chose in action[,]” Section
2113(b) is broader in that it includes “any
property or money or any other thing of
value exceeding $100.” Id. (citing W.
LaFave & A. Scott, Handbook on Criminal
Law 633 (1972)).  Second, whereas
common law larceny required theft from
the owner’s possession, Section 2113(b) is
more expansive in that “[i]t applies when
the property ‘belong[s] to,’ or is ‘in the
care, custody, control, management, or
possession of,’ a covered institution.”  Id.
at 360-361 (citations omitted).  Based on
the above analysis, the Court held that
notwithstanding the “common law” label
attached to § 2113(b), more “generic,
contemporary” definitions proscribe Bell’s
conduct here, explaining:
Although the term “larceny”
appears in the legislative reports,
the congressional purpose plainly
was to protect banks from those
who wished to steal banks’ assets –
even if they used no force in doing
so . . . . To the extent that a bank
needs protection against larceny by
trick, it also needs protection from
false pretenses. We cannot believe
that Congress wished to limit the
scope of the amended Act’s
coverage, and thus limit its
remedial purpose, on the basis of an
arcane and artificial distinction
more suited to the social conditions
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of 18th century England than the
needs of 20th century America.
Such an interpretation would signal
a return to the “incongruous
results” that the 1937 amendment
was designed to eliminate.
462 U.S. at 362. 
Thus, the marching order we
receive from the Court is that in
interpreting federal criminal statutes where
there is no specific definition, do not fall
in love with the label attached to an
offense.  
We now turn to an analysis of the
“generic, contemporary” definitions of the
t er m s “ t h e f t o f f e n s e ,”  S ec t i o n
1103(a)(43)(G), and “an offense that
involves fraud or deceit,” Section
1103(a)(43)(M)(i), to determine whether
either or both of these “aggravated
offense” provisions applies to offenses
under Pennsylvania’s theft by deception
statute.  For this we look to logical
reasoning and the background of the
“aggravated offense” provisions enacted
by Congress and the foundation of the
theft by deception statute adopted by
Pennsylvania’s legislature.    
XI.
 At the onset, we agree with our
sister circuits that it was Congress’ intent
for a “theft offense” to include more than
what was considered larceny at common
law:  “[B]y choosing the words ‘theft
offense’ rather than just ‘theft,’ . . .
Congress signaled that it was not
presenting an exhaustive list of offenses
(i.e. just theft and receipt); rather, with its
word choices, Congress indicated that the
phrase ought to be given a broad read.”
See Hernandez-Mancilla v. INS, 246 F.3d
1002, 1008 (7th Cir. 2001); see also
United States v. Corona-Sanchez, 291 F.3d
1201, 1205 (9th Cir. 2002) (en banc)
(“Congress used the words ‘theft offense’
rather than just ‘theft,’ thus indicating that
the phrase ought be read to incorporate
different but closely related constructions
in modern state statutes.”).  Under the
Code, “theft” includes theft by unlawful
taking or disposition; theft by deception;
theft by extortion; theft of property lost,
mislaid, or delivered by mistake; receiving
stolen property; theft of services; theft by
failure to make required disposition of
funds received; and unauthorized use of
automobiles and other vehicles.  Model
Penal Code §§ 223.2-223.9.  In
Hernandez-Mancilla, the Seventh Circuit
engaged in an extensive discussion of the
background of the term “theft offense” as
used by Congress in the INA, including an
evaluation of theft offenses set forth in the
Code, and came up with the definition: “a
taking of property or an exercise of control
over property without consent.” 246 F.3d
at 1009.   The Ninth Circuit has adopted
this definition, Corona-Sanchez, 291 F.3d
at 1205, and a panel within this Circuit has
relied on it in a not-for-publication
opinion, Williams v. INS, 54 Fed. Appx.
55 (3d Cir. 2002) (Judges Fuentes, Sloviter
and Debevoise).  
We agree that given this broad
definition, Nugent’s bad check transaction
for which he was convicted under the
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Pennsylvania theft by deception statute is
a “theft offense” as set forth in Section
1103(a)(43)(G).  Indeed, a worthless check
is “property” within the scope of
Pennsylvania’s theft by deception statute.
As we have explained previously, in
common law larceny it was not so
regarded: “common law larceny was
limited to thefts of tangible personal
property.  This limitation excluded, for
example, the theft of a written instrument
embodying a chose in action.”  Bell, 462
U.S. at 362.  Pennsylvania’s consolidated
theft statute, which we note was taken
verbatim from Code § 223.0, defines
“property” in the context of theft offenses:
Anything of value, including real
estate, tangible and intangible
personal property, contract rights,
choses- in-act ion ,  and o ther
interests in or claims to wealth,
admission or transportation tickets,
captured or domestic animals, food
and drink, electric or other power.
18 Pa. Cons. Stat. Ann. § 3901 (emphasis
added).  Wharton teaches that a chose-in-
action includes “bonds and notes of all
classes.” Wharton’s Criminal law, supra, §
876, at 62.  A chose-in-action is defined as
“[a] right to receive or recover a debt, or
money, or damages for breach of contract,
or for a tort connected with contract, but
which cannot be enforced without action,”
and includes “a check on a bank.”  See 1
Bouvier’s Law Dictionary 483 (8th ed.
1914).
We must conclude then that a bank
check is regarded as property in the
context of “generic, contemporary”
larceny, or theft, concepts requiring
“caption” (when the actor secured
dominion over the property of another) and
“asportation” (carrying away of the other’s
property), and therefore Nugent’s bad
check transaction for which he was
convicted under Pennsylvania’s theft by
deception statute is a “theft offense” under
18 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43)(G).  This does
not, however, end our inquiry. 
  The sole question for decision is
whether with in the p urvie w of
Pennsylvania’s theft by deception statute,
Section 3922, Nugent’s conviction for
passing a bad check represents “an offense
involving fraud or deceit” under 8 U.S.C.
§ 1101(a)(43)(M)(i), notwithstanding that
it also constitutes a “theft offense” under 8
U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43)G).  If we decide that
Nugent’s conviction is “an offense that
involves fraud or deceit” as well as “a theft
offense,” then to qualify as an aggravated
felony under the INA it must meet the
r e q u i r e m e n t s  o f  S e c t i o n
1101(a)(43)(M)(i), loss to the victim of
more than $10,000, in addition to Section
1101(a)(43)(G), term of imprisonment of
at least one year.  Here it is stipulated that
Nugent’s state conviction was based on a
bad check amounting to only $4,831.26,
and therefore Nugent’s conviction could
not be an aggravated felony if Section
1101(a)(43)(M)(i) applies. 
And the distinction is especially
critical to Nugent because if we determine
that both the district court in the habeas
corpus proceeding and the IJ in the
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removal proceeding erred in concluding
that his state offense amounted to an
aggravated felony under the INA, then, as
we have emphasized previously, Nugent
will be able to apply for cancellation of
removal pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1229b.
Conviction of an “aggravated felony”
prohibits such relief.  See 8 U.S.C. §
1229b(a)(3).  
For the reasons that follow, we are
persuaded that Appellant is correct in his
contention that he was not guilty of an
aggravated felony when he was convicted
of Pennsylvania’s statutory offense of theft
by deception in which the victims’ loss did
not exceed $10,000.  
XII. 
 Title 8 U.S.C.  § 1101(a) provides:
(43) The term ‘aggravated felony’
means – 
(G) a theft offense (including
receipt of stolen property) or
burglary offense for which the term
of imprisonment [is] at least one
year. 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43)(G);
[and]
(M) an offense that – (i)  involves
fraud or deceit in which the loss to
the victim or victims exceeds
$ 1 0 , 0 0 0 [ . ]   8  U .S .C .  §
1101(a)(43)(M)(i)
The term “offense” means “[t]he
doing that which a penal law forbids to be
done, or omitting to do what it
commands.” Bouvier’s Law Dictionary
2399 (3rd ed. 1914). 
In comparing these two subsections
of Section 1101(a)(43), we are struck by
several distinctions.  First, we note that (G)
is limited to “a theft offense;” second, in
(M), Congress uses the broader term “an
offense” (as does every other 14 different
offenses set forth in (43) (E), (H) through
(L) and  (N) through (U);3 third, (M) and
the laundering money offense (D) are the
only offenses listed in Section (43) that set
a minimum amount of damages that must
be proved before the offense may qualify
as an “aggravated felony.”
 These distinctions are significant.
It could be that because all other offense
3 Offenses relating to explosive
materials, firearms, violence, demand for
receipt of ransom, child pornography,
racketeering influenced corrupt
organizations, gambling, prostitution,
peonage, slavery or involuntary
servitude, misuse of national defense
information, alien smuggling, smuggling,
failure to appear for service of a
sentence, bribery, counterfeiting, forgery,
trafficking in altered vehicle
identification numbers, obstruction of
justice, perjury or subornation of perjury,
bribery of a witness, failure to appear
before a court on a felony charge, an
attempt or conspiracy to commit an
offense described in § 1101(a)(43).
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portions of Section 1101(a)(43) are listed
in the universal form “offense” rather than
the limited or particular form “theft
offense,” that Congress intended that
Subsection M(i) apply only to theft
offenses.  Indeed, a case could be made
that was its intention.  This view would
find support in the rules of logic discussed
heretofore in the distinctions between
universal and particular propositions, and
distributed and undistributed terms.  In any
event, for our immediate purposes, it is not
necessary for us to decide how many of the
other 14 offenses listed in Section
1101(a)(43), if any, are limited by
Subsection M(i).  And we expressly do not
do so.  Suffice it to say, we decide here
only that M(i) clearly applies to those
“theft offenses” under Subsection (G) that
are anchored on “fraud or deceit.” 
In the view we take we therefore
reject the “either-or” arguments advanced
by the parties.  We reject the government’s
contention that the naked language of
Subsection (G) compels a conclusion that
Nugent committed an “aggravated felony”
as defined by Section 1103(a)(43) of the
INA; and also reject Nugent’s argument
that Subsection (G) does not apply, that he
did not commit a theft, but only an offense
involving fraud or deceit under Subsection
(M)(i).
Instead, we hold that Congress’
intent was for both G and M(i) to apply to
an “offense” involving “theft” and “fraud
or deceit,” and thus the requirements of
both provisions must be fulfilled for such
an offense to qualify as an aggravated
felony for purposes of the INA.
Accordingly, we must decide in favor of
the Appellant because the property loss
involved was less than the statutory
minimum.
A.
First, the logicians teach us that a
term, such as “an offense” as contained in
Section 1101(a)(43)(M) or “a theft
offense” as in Section 1101(a)(43)(G), is
said to have both a quality and a quantity.
Here we are concerned with quantity. The
quantity of a proposition is universal or
particular according to whether the
proposition refers to all members of a class
or to some members of the class
designated by its subject term.  In the case
of (M) we have a term representing all
members of a class – “an offense.” 
When a term contains no
restrictions (as in (M) – “an offense”),
logicians refer to it as “distributed,” and
the proposition of which it is the subject as
“universal” and is a class.  In the universe
of offenses set forth in  Section
1101(a)(43), however, the term “theft
offense” in (G) is predicated on some, but
not all, of the distributed term “an offense”
in (M), and is therefore considered as
“undistributed” and is a subclass.  The
proposition of which it is the subject is
denoted as a “particular.”  See Ruggero J.
Aldisert, Logic for Lawyers: A Guide to
Clear Legal Thinking 57-59 (3rd ed.
1997); Irving M. Copi, Introduction to
Logic 173 (7th ed. 1986).  Expressed in
less technical phrasing: “All theft offenses
are offenses, but not all offenses are theft
offenses.”  
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We are taught that conclusions in
all reasoning, including legal reasoning,
deductive or inductive analogy, “derive[]
their validity from the axiom known as the
dictum de omni et nullo, which states:
“What is true of the universal (or class) is
true of the particular (or subclass).”
Joseph Gerard Brennan, A Handbook of
Logic 64 (1957); see also Ralph M. Eaton,
General Logic 97 (1931).  This is an axiom
concerning all or none in its class.  It was
first established by Aristotle, but in today’s
legal reasoning it is the unstated linchpin
in formulating the major premise in every
categorical deductive syllogism that
lawyers use in their briefs, and judges in
their opinions.  The axiom may also be
stated as: If every member of a class has
(or does not have) a certain property, and
if certain individuals are included in that
class, then these individuals have (or do
not have) the property.  See L.S. Stebbing,
A Modern Introduction to Logic 86 (6th
ed. 1948) (“[t]hat one term should be
included in another as in a whole is the
same as for the other to be predicated of all
of the first”) (quoting Aristotle, Anal.
Priora, 24(b) 26-30).
We believe, therefore, that the
logical framework used to support the
conclusion we reach can be set forth in the
following polysyllogism:4
Depriving another of property by
fraud or deceit is an offense (M).
The offense of theft by deception
deprives another of property by
theft (G). 
Therefore, the offense of theft by
deception is an offense under (M)
and (G). 
* * * * *
The offense of theft by deception is
an offense under (M) and (G).
A violation of Pennsylvania’s theft
by deception statute, § 3922, is an
offense of theft by deception. 
The re fo re ,  a  v io l a t ion  o f
Pennsylvania’s theft by deception
statute, § 3922, is an offense under
(M) and (G).
4 A polysyllogism is defined as “a
series of syllogisms in which the
conclusion of one becomes the premise
of the next. In such a series the syllogism
whose conclusion becomes the
succeeding premise is called the
prosyllogism; a syllogism in which one
premise is the conclusion of a preceding
syllogism is call an episyllogism.” Logic
for Lawyers, supra, at 64.
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With the foregoing as our analytical
guide, we now proceed to evaluate the
elements of Sections 1101(a)(43)(G) and
(M)(i) of the INA and those of the
Pennsylvania theft by deception statute, 18
Pa. Cons. Ann. Stat. § 3922.  It is beyond
cavil that the particular or subclass
Pennsylvania statute under which Nugent
was convicted falls within the purview of
“a theft offense (including receipt of stolen
property) or burglary offense for which the
term of imprisonment [is] at least one
year.” 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43)(G).  The
sole question for decision is whether
Pennsylvania’s theft by deception statute,
w hich is  subs um ed in S ectio n
1101(a)(43)(G) as a particular “theft
offense,” also comes within the universal
(or class) nature of “an offense” bottomed
on fraud or deceit under Section
1101(a)(43)(M)(i).  We hold that it does.
B.
         First, under the teachings of Bell, we
decide that in drafting the INA, Congress
recognized the distinction in theft offenses
coming within the common law offense of
larceny and the statutory offense of false
pretenses.  It recognized that larceny
required a taking (caption) and carrying
away (asportation) of another’s property.
A taking occurs when the offender secures
dominion over the property, and a carrying
away requires slight movement away of
the property.  LaFave, supra, at 74.
Congress knew that the offense of false
pretenses was not known at common law,
and that it is statutory in nature and stems
from 30 Geo II, c. 24 (1757), which
punishes one who “knowingly and
designedly, by false pretense or pretenses,
shall obtain from any person or persons,
money, goods, wares or merchandises,
with intent to cheat or defraud any person
or persons of the same.”  Accordingly, we
believe that when Congress defined a
particular species of aggravated felony in
Section 1101(a)(43)(M)(i) as “an offense
that . . . involves fraud or deceit” it had in
mind, inter alia, the statutory offense of
false pretenses.  
The Pennsylvania’s theft by
deception statute under which Nugent was
convicted provides in part: 
(a) Offense defined – A person is
guilty of theft if he intentionally
obtains or withholds property of
another by deception.  A person
deceives if he intentionally:
(1) creates or reinforces a false
impress ion , inc luding f alse
impressions as to law, value,
intention or other state of mind; but
deception as to a person’s intention
to perform a promise shall not be
inferred from the fact alone that he
did not subsequently perform the
promise . . . .
18 Pa. Cons. Stat. Ann. § 3922.  In
evaluating this statute, we turn to relevant
provisions and the ALI’s accompanying
commentary of the Code.  We are obliged
to do this because 18 Pa. Cons. Stat. Ann.
§ 3922, theft by deception, was adopted by
the Pennsylvania legislature word for word
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from Code § 223.3, theft by deception. 
E x a m i n i n g  t h e  o f f i c i a l
commentaries of the ALI relating to §
223.3, we are informed that this section
“covers that portion of the consolidated
offense of theft that derives from the
traditional offense of obtaining property by
false pretenses . . . [which] is statutory in
origin.  It stems from 30 Geo 2, ch. 24
(1757).”  ALI, Model Penal Code and
Commentaries, § 223.3 Theft by
Deception, 180 and n.1 (1980).  The ALI
makes clear that “theft by deception” states
the elements of the statutory offense of
false pretenses.   Moreover, the
commentaries indicate that many states
have adopted § 223.3 and many other
states have enacted statutes that also
describe false pretenses as “theft.” 
It is significant that in the very
language of Pennsylvania’s theft by
deception statute, various forms of the
word “deceive” appear in five places;
“false impression,” in three places.
Supporting our conclusion that a
Pennsylvania theft by deception offense
falls within the purview of Section
1101(a)(43)(M)(i) of the INA are accepted
definitions of the words “fraud” and
“deceit” as used in that provision.  Fraud
has been defined as “conduct which
operates prejudicially on the rights of
others, and is so intended; deception
practiced to induce another to part with
property, or surrender some legal right,
and which accomplished the end desired.”
James Ballentine, Law Dictionary with
Pronunciations 526 (1930). “In common
parlance, the word ‘defraud’ means to
cheat or wrongfully deprive another of his
property by deception or artifice.”  United
States v. Thomas, 315 F.3d 190, 200 (3d
Cir. 2002) (internal quotations and citation
omitted); see also United States v.
Summers, 19 F.2d 627 (W.D. Va. 1927)
(“The word ‘fraud,’ as commonly used,
implies deceit, deception, artifice,
trickery.”).  Ballentine defines “deceit” as
“[a] species of fraud; actual fraud
consisting of any false representation or
contrivance whereby one person
overreaches and misleads another to his
hurt.” Ballentine, supra, at 335.  By its
very language, the Pennsylvania statute is
bottomed on “fraud” and “deceit.”  
This, too, must be said.  In
commentary accompanying the proposed
official draft of the Code dealing with
“Bad Checks,” § 224.5, the ALI stated:
“[I]f the check is over $500.00, the passer
could be prosecuted for felonious theft by
deception, under Sections 223.1(2) and
223.3.”  ALI, Model Penal Code, Reprint
– Proposed Official Draft (May 4, 1962).
Moreover, in the Official Comment to the
Pennsylvania bad checks statute, 18 Pa.
Cons. Stat. Ann § 4105, we are told: “A
person who passes a bad check could be
prosecuted for theft by deception under
Section 3922.”  As in 18 U.S.C. §
1103(a)(43)(M)(i), the structure of
Pennsylvania’s theft by deception statute
includes a minimum amount of damages to
qualify as an elevated offense. 
The final reason, and not the least
important, why we believe that Congress
intended to import the provisions of (M)(i)
into the “theft offenses” of (G) is that were
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we not to consider “theft offenses” as a
subclass of “an offense that . . . involves
fraud or deceit,” the application of (M)(i)
would be seldom invoked.  Moreover,
were it not for the $10,000 loss limitation
of (M)(i), then in those jurisdictions like
Pennsylvania that hold that a person who
passes a bad check of a modest amount
could be convicted of theft by deception,
we would be faced with the anomalous
situation that the minor offense would be
considered an aggravated felony.  
For all of these reasons, we
conclude that a conviction under
Pennsylvania’s theft by deception statute is
the type of offense that comes within 8
U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43)(M)(i), “an offense
that . . . involves fraud or deceit,” albeit it
too comes  wi th in 8  U.S .C . §
1101(a)(43)(G), “a theft offense.”
Because the particular Pennsylvania statute
is designed entirely on all-embracing
concepts of fraud or deceit – various forms
of the word “deceive” appear five times
and “false impression” three times – it is
precisely the particular type of theft
contemplated in the universal class of
offenses set forth in the fraud or deceit
Subsection 1101(a)(43)(M)(i).  We
therefore apply the axiom de omni et
nullo: what is true of the universal (or
class) in § 1101(a)(43)(M)(i) is true for the
p a r t ic u l a r  ( o r  s u b c l a s s )  i n  §
1101(a)(43)(G).  
* * * * *
In reaching our ultimate conclusion,
therefore, we follow the teachings of
Drakes and conclude that “more ‘generic,
contemporary’ definitions” found in the
Code ,  a s adop ted  ve rba tim  by
Pennsylvania’s legislature, supply the
meaning that “best accords with the
overall purposes of the statute.”  240 F.3d
at 249 (internal quotation and citations
omitted).  We determine that although an
offense under the Pennsylvania statute is a
“thef t offense” so tha t Sectio n
1101(a)(43)(G) applies, because the state
statute is bottomed on “fraud or deceit,”
the offense must also meet the
requirements of Section 1101(a)(43)(M)(i)
to qualify as an aggravated felony under
the INA.  We accordingly conclude that
Nugent’s bad checks transaction for which
he was convicted under Pennsylvania’s
theft by deception statute does not qualify
as an aggravated felony as defined by the
INA, because although the term of
imprisonment imposed on Nugent was one
year or more, the victims’ loss did not
exceed $10,000.  
Accordingly, we will dismiss the
petition for review at No. 02-0329 for lack
of jurisdiction.  In the appeal at No. 04-
1541, for reasons other than those stated
by the district court as set forth above, we
will affirm the judgment of the district
court without prejudice to the Appellant to
apply to the Attorney General for
cancellation of the removal order pursuant
to 8 U.S.C. § 1229b.5
5Title 8 U.S.C. § 1229b(e) limits
the number of actions by the Attorney
General that cancel the removal or
adjusts the status of aliens under section
1229b.
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Rendell, Circuit Judge - Concurring.
I am pleased to join in the majority’s
scholarly opinion.   As amply demonstrated
by the majority’s historical exegesis, theft
by deception is a hybrid crime that is both
a theft offense, 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43)(G),
and an offense involving fraud or deceit, 8
U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43)(M)(i).  Therefore, in
order to qualify as an aggravated felony, it
must be shown that Nugent’s conviction
for theft by deception qualifies under the
statutory definitions for both theft offenses
and fraud/deceit offenses.  I think this is
necessary to carry out Congress’s intention.
Nugent’s conviction was for an offense
that involved deceit resulting in a loss of
less than the $10,000 minimum set forth in
(M)(i).  However, while I applaud Judge
Aldisert’s logical tour de force in devising
a way to reason to this conclusion under
the statute, I write separately to stress that
this logic should not compel that we
combine definitions within this section, as
a general rule.  Rather, only where an
offense is a hybrid—as I submit theft by
deception is—and the aggravated felony
classifications contain two distinct, clearly
applicable tests, should we conclude that
both must be fulfilled in order for the
offense to qualify as an aggravated felony.
